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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union. The District 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2012) because the claims arose under the laws of the United 
States, namely the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from any final decision of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Union. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). The notice of ap-
peal was filed in a timely manner. Fed. R. App. 4(a). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Is the ESA’s taking provision a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce power, as applied to the Karner Blue Butterfly 
found on the Cordelia Lot? 
II. Is Cordelia Lear’s takings claim ripe, despite failing to ap-
ply for an Incidental Taking Permit? 
III. Is the relevant parcel in this takings analysis the entirety 
of Lear Island or the subdivided Cordelia Lot? 
IV. Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, is 
Cordelia Lear entitled to compensation for a total taking 
when the property retains future economic value? 
V. Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, does 
the $1,000 offer for wildlife viewings preclude a total taking 
claim for complete loss of economic value? 
VI. Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, do 
public trust principles inherent in title preclude a takings 
claim based on the denial of the county wetlands permit? 
VII. Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, 
should the Fish and Wildlife Service and Brittain County 
be jointly liable for a total taking, even though their respec-
tive regulations only restrict portions of the property? 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Union. Specifically, this case involves the applica-
tion of the ESA and a municipal wetlands law to the property 
owned by Cordelia Lear (“Plaintiff”). The Plaintiff wants to build a 
single-family residence on the property. However, this property is 
inhabited by the Karner Blue Butterfly, an endangered species. As 
required by the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) di-
rected the Plaintiff to apply for an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) 
in order to build on the area of the property inhabited by the but-
terfly. Instead of applying for an ITP, the Plaintiff created an al-
ternative development plan (“ADP”) in which she would build on 
another portion of her property containing wetlands. However, 
Brittain County denied the Plaintiff’s permit to build on the wet-
lands because the proposed residence did not meet the County’s 
“water-dependent use” requirements. 
The Plaintiff filed this suit against the FWS and Brittain 
County. The Plaintiff waived any damages in excess of $10,000 in 
her takings claim against the United States, allowing her to pro-
ceed with her claim in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Union. In her lawsuit, the Plaintiff sought a declara-
tion that the ESA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional 
legislative power. Alternatively, the Plaintiff claimed that both the 
FWS and Brittain County took her property without just compen-
sation, thereby violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The Plaintiff only brought a total takings 
claim and did not advance a claim for a partial or temporary tak-
ing. The parties endured a seven-day bench trial before the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union. 
The Court determined that the ESA is a valid exercise of Con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the 
Court awarded the Plaintiff damages of $10,000 against the FWS 
and $90,000 against Brittain County for an unconstitutional tak-
ing of the Plaintiff’s property. All three parties appealed and now 
seek review from this Court. 
 
 
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case center on two separate regulations placed 
on the Plaintiff’s property and how these regulations impact her 
property rights. 
Lear Island History. Lear Island is a 1,000-acre island lo-
cated in Brittain County, New Union. R. at 4. Lear Island sits 
within Lake Union, a large interstate lake traditionally used for 
interstate navigation. Id. In 1803, Congress granted Cornelius 
Lear title in fee simple absolute to all of Lear Island, including 
lands underwater within 300 feet of the shoreline. R. at 4-5. In the 
early twentieth century, the Lear family built one causeway that 
connects Lear Island to the mainland of Brittain County. R. at 5. 
Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied the entire is-
land since 1803, primarily using the land as a homestead. Id. 
In 1965, King James Lear, owning the entirety of Lear Island, 
sought to divide the island into three parcels, one for each of his 
three daughters. Id. King Lear created the 550-acre Goneril Lot, 
440-acre Regan Lot, and 10-acre Cordelia Lot. Id. King Lear then 
deeded the respective lots to his daughters, while reserving a life 
estate in each lot for himself. Id. 
The Plaintiff came into possession of the Cordelia Lot in 2005, 
upon the death of her father, King Lear. Id. The Cordelia Lot is 
only accessible through the main portion of Lear Island. Id. The 
10-acre Cordelia Lot consists of an access strip, a nine-acre open 
field covered in lupine flowers, and one acre of wetlands. Id. The 
wetlands are in a cove, accessible to open water, and were tradi-
tionally used as a boat landing. Id. The Lear family has kept the 
nine-acre lupine field, also known as the “Heath,” open by annual 
mowing. Id. The Heath is inhabited by the Karner Blue Butterfly, 
an endangered species. R. at 6. 
Karner Blue Butterfly Protection. The Karner Blue Butter-
fly obtained the protection of the ESA in 1992. Id. Although Karner 
Blue Butterflies are found in other states, the last remaining pop-
ulation in New Union lives on the Heath of the Cordelia Lot. Id. 
This subpopulation on the Heath is entirely intrastate and does 
not cross any State boundaries. Id. Accordingly, in 1992, the FWS 
designated the Heath as a critical habitat for the New Union sub-
population of Karner Blue Butterfly. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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FWS Permit Recommendation. In April 2012, the Plaintiff 
contacted the FWS to inquire whether she would need any permits 
to build a single-family residence on the Heath of the Cordelia Lot. 
R. at 4, 6. The FWS advised the Plaintiff that any disturbance of 
the Heath, other than continued annual mowing, would constitute 
a “take” of an endangered species. R. at 6. However, the FWS in-
formed the Plaintiff that it was possible to obtain an ITP under 
section 10 of the ESA. Id. 
The FWS field agent advised the Plaintiff to include in her ap-
plication a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) for the Karner Blue 
Butterfly. Id. The field agent also informed the Plaintiff that an 
approvable HCP would provide for additional contiguous lupine 
habitat on an acre-for-acre basis and a commitment to continue 
annual mowing of the remaining lupine fields. Id. Without the an-
nual mowing, the natural ecological process would eliminate the 
Karner Blue Butterfly’s habitat in approximately ten years. R. at 
7. 
Wetlands Protection. The Plaintiff elected not to pursue an 
ITP, and instead proposed an ADP that would not disturb the lu-
pine fields. Id. The Plaintiff proposed filling one-half acre of the 
wetlands to create a building site, along with a connecting cause-
way to provide access to the shared mainland causeway. Id. Brit-
tain County denied the wetlands fill permit, however, because the 
1982 Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law only allows wet-
lands to be filled for water-dependent uses. Id. 
The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot is $100,000. Id. The 
Lot requires $1,500 in annual property taxes. Id. However, the 
Plaintiff has not sought a reassessment of the value of the Cordelia 
Lot since the denial of the permit under the Brittain County Wet-
lands Preservation Law. Id. Moreover, the Plaintiff rejected an of-
fer from the Brittain County Butterfly Society of $1,000 per year 
for the right to conduct butterfly viewing outings during the sum-
mer. Id. 
The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the FWS and Brittain 
County. Id. The Plaintiff claimed that the ESA is unconstitutional, 
and, in the alternative, brought a takings claim against both the 
FWS and Brittain County. Id. The District Court held that the ESA 
is a valid exercise of Congressional power and awarded damages 
5
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against the FWS and Brittain County for an unconstitutional tak-
ing. All three parties appealed and now seek review from this 
Court. R. at 4. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to reg-
ulate three categories of activities among the States. Specific to 
this case is Congress’s power to regulate activities that “substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.” Thus far, the Supreme Court 
has held that only activities which are “economic in nature” sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Because the ESA specifically 
prohibits the taking of endangered species, this Court must evalu-
ate whether the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly “substantially 
affects” interstate commerce. As this butterfly is neither economic 
nor commercial, there is no substantial effect on the commerce of 
the United States. Additionally, the ESA is a statute focused pri-
marily on conservation and not economic activity. Therefore, Con-
gress does not have the power to regulate this intrastate butterfly 
on the Plaintiff’s property. 
For a regulatory taking, a taking is not ripe until the regulat-
ing government agency issues a final decision. The ESA prohibits 
the taking of certain species, but will grant an ITP with an accepta-
ble application. The approval or denial of an ITP is typically viewed 
as the final decision for ESA takings. Here, the Plaintiff did not 
apply for an ITP before she brought her takings claim. Further, the 
District Court erred in finding that: the FWS declared a policy 
denying the Plaintiff a permit; the permit would exceed the fair 
market value of the property; and the permit process is overly bur-
densome. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s takings claim is unripe and 
should be barred. 
In a takings analysis, courts are instructed to view the “parcel 
as a whole” to determine whether a taking warrants compensation. 
In applying the “parcel as a whole” rule, the court should focus on 
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” of the claimant 
and whether a given property is treated as a “single economic unit.” 
Courts should also balance “fairness and justice” to ensure that 
both the rights of property owners and governmental interests are 
protected. Here, the Plaintiff has no reasonable investment-backed 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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expectations in the Cordelia Lot because she had notice of the reg-
ulatory restrictions on the Lot when she received ownership of the 
property. Equally important, the Lear family has treated Lear Is-
land as a single parcel for over 200 years. Thus, fairness and justice 
support viewing the entirety of Lear Island as the relevant parcel, 
and not solely the subdivided Cordelia Lot. 
Even if this Court finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant 
parcel, a total taking has not occurred. To qualify as a total taking, 
the property must have 100% of its economic value physically 
taken or restricted. The regulations on the Cordelia Lot are at most 
a moratorium because the Plaintiff will have full use of the entire 
property in the near future. The Supreme Court has held that mor-
atoriums are temporary takings and not total takings. Therefore, 
the Plaintiff’s total takings claim fails. 
Similarly, the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay 
$1,000 per year for wildlife viewing precludes a total takings claim. 
Total takings law is replete with “all-or-nothing” scenarios where 
a plaintiff lost nearly all the beneficial use of his or her land, and 
yet was not due compensation. Moreover, the $1,500 property tax 
does not negate the value of the Butterfly Society’s offer. It is not 
the government’s responsibility to ensure the marketability and 
profitability of a citizen’s land. The offer is evidence that economi-
cally beneficial uses still exist. Further, courts have held that mon-
etary benefits are not the only definition of “beneficial use.” Accord-
ingly, the present economic value of the property precludes the 
Plaintiff’s total takings claim. 
Even if the relevant parcel is solely the Cordelia Lot, public 
trust principles inherent in title preclude the Plaintiff’s claim 
against Brittain County. The cove of the Lot provides access to 
Lake Union, which as a “navigable-in-fact-waterway,” makes it 
part of the public trust. The District Court improperly held that 
Lake Union could not be included in the public trust in 1803. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has held that the conveyance of title by 
Congress to the soil beneath a navigable waterway becomes void 
upon the admittance of a state into the Union, and is thereafter 
regulated according to state law. Therefore, the grant of the under-
water lands to the Lears in 1803 became void when New Union 
became a state. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s claim is precluded be-
cause filling public trust wetlands equates to a nuisance arising 
from the background principles of state law. 
7
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Finally, the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preserva-
tion Law must be considered separately. In a novel question, the 
District Court applied what it incorrectly called the “prevailing” 
tort rule of joint liability to a takings case. However, most states 
apply either several liability or modified joint and several liability. 
Further, the damages here are easily divisible. Even if the Court 
finds a total taking, the County should only be liable for, at most, 
ten percent of the value of the property based upon the one acre 
restricted by the County wetlands law. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See 
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986); Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). Here, the facts 
upon which the District Court rendered its judgment are not in 
dispute. Rather, the County argues that the District Court misap-
plied the law in finding a total taking. Therefore, this Court should 
review the District Court’s order de novo. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF 
CONGRESS’S COMMERCE POWER BECAUSE 
THE TAKING OF THE BRITTAIN COUNTY 
SUBPOPULATION OF KARNER BLUE 
BUTTERFLY DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY 
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the limited 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. ART. 
I, § 8, CL. 3. In interpreting the Commerce Clause, the Supreme 
Court recognizes three categories of activity among the States that 
Congress may regulate: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; 
(2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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that substantially affect interstate commerce.1 See United States 
v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 558-59; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 608-09. Thus far, the Supreme Court has held that only activ-
ities that are “economic in nature” qualify as “substantially af-
fect[ing] interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
For example, in Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun 
Free School Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms 
within 1,000 feet of a school zone, did not regulate an economic 
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce and therefore 
was unconstitutional. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. Similarly, in Mor-
rison, the Supreme Court held that the Violence Against Women 
Act, which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-
based violence, did not regulate economic activity substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce, and therefore was an unlawful exer-
cise of the Commerce Power. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
Here, the FWS asks this Court to find that the taking of the 
Karner Blue Butterfly on the Cordelia Lot is an economic activity 
that affects interstate commerce. Based on an examination of the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the 
FWS and District Court’s claims are in error. The regulated activ-
ity is the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly, which is categorically 
a noneconomic activity. The Plaintiff taking this butterfly has little 
to no effect on interstate commerce. Additionally, the ESA is fun-
damentally a conservation statute, leaving Congress without con-
stitutional authority to regulate this wholly intrastate butterfly. 
A. The Regulated and Relevant Activity Is the Taking 
of the Karner Blue Butterfly and Not the Proposed 
Construction of a Private Residence. 
Before determining whether an activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, the activity at issue must be identified. Mor-
rison, 529 U.S. at 610. To do so, courts are instructed to examine 
the activity “expressly regulated” by Congress. GDF Realty Invest-
ments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, the 
District Court improperly determined that “the relevant activity is 
 
1. It is undisputed that the ESA’s taking provision is not regulating a chan-
nel or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Therefore, it must survive judicial 
scrutiny under the “substantial effects” analysis as described in Lopez and Mor-
rison.  
9
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the underlying land development through construction of the pro-
posed residence.” R. at 8. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 
F.3d 1062, 1069. 
Other courts have entirely rejected this inference-based inter-
pretation of “regulated activity.” As the Fifth Circuit noted, “Con-
gress, through [the] ESA, is not directly regulating commercial de-
velopment.” GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634. The ESA specifically 
states: “[W]ith respect to any endangered species . . . it is unlawful 
for any person . . . to . . . take any such species within the United 
States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Therefore, the plain language of 
the ESA requires this Court to determine whether taking an en-
dangered species, i.e., the Karner Blue Butterfly, “substantially af-
fects” interstate commerce. 
Even if this Court finds that the regulated and relevant activ-
ity is the underlying land development, building one private resi-
dence on private property does not “substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” See, e.g., Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848, 854-55 (2000). In 
Jones, the Supreme Court held that the proper inquiry is “the func-
tion of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that 
function affects interstate commerce.” Id. 
There is no evidence to support the District Court’s claim that 
purchasing building materials or hiring contractors would require 
any interstate activities. R. at 8. Additionally, this Court must look 
at the function of the proposed single family residence. Jones, 529 
U.S. at 854-55. One residential home on an island does not affect 
interstate commerce. To accept the opposite view would “effectu-
ally obliterate” the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause, as 
“[t]here would be no limit to Congress’ authority to regulate intra-
state activities.” GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634. Therefore, this 
Court should follow the plain language of the ESA and reverse the 
District Court’s finding. 
B. The Taking of a Noneconomic, Intrastate Butterfly 
Does Not Satisfy the Lopez and Morrison Test for 
Substantially Affecting Interstate Commerce. 
After establishing that the regulated and relevant activity is 
the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly, the Court must then de-
termine whether the activity “substantially affects” interstate com-
merce. To do so, the Court must evaluate whether the: (1) regula-
tion relates to an economic activity; (2) statute contains an “express 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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jurisdictional element” which might limit the regulation’s reach; 
(3) legislative history contains “express congressional findings re-
garding the effects upon interstate commerce;” and (4) connection 
between the regulated activity and substantial effect on interstate 
commerce is “attenuated.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12. This bal-
ance is required to show “whether a rational basis existed for con-
cluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate 
commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. Here, the District Court erred 
by relying upon factually and legally distinguishable decisions 
from other circuits, and failed to balance the four factors articu-
lated in Morrison. 
1. The Regulation Does Not Relate to an 
Economic Activity Because the Plaintiff’s 
Taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly Is Not an 
Economic Activity. 
The first factor a court must assess under Lopez and Morrison 
is whether the regulated activity includes an “economic endeavor.” 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. The Supreme Court has upheld “con-
gressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where [the 
Court] concluded that the activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60. Acts previously upheld in-
clude: regulations involving coal mining, credit transactions, res-
taurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, and inns and ho-
tels catering to interstate guests. Id. 
Logic, however, cannot support finding that the taking of the 
Brittain County Karner Blue Butterfly is similar to any of the 
aforementioned economic activities. Yet, the FWS asks this Court 
to find that a mere butterfly, possibly never seen by any resident 
of New Union besides a member of the Lear family, is somehow an 
economic activity affecting the commerce of the United States. As 
the late Justice Scalia stated, “[A]lthough Congress’s authority to 
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce is broad, it does not permit the Court to ‘pile inference 
upon inference’ . . . to establish that noneconomic activity has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 31 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Karner Blue Butter-
fly in Brittain County has little commercial or economic value, and 
is found on just nine acres of private land. Hence, the taking of this 
butterfly is categorically noneconomic. 
11
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2. No Jurisdictional Element Exists to Ensure 
that Regulated ESA Takings Have a 
Substantial Affect on Interstate Commerce. 
The next factor this Court must consider is whether the ESA’s 
takings provision contains an “express jurisdictional element 
which might limit [the regulation’s] reach to . . . an explicit connec-
tion with or effect on interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
611-12. In other words, courts look to whether there is language in 
the statute limiting regulation only to activities that affect inter-
state commerce. Id. This jurisdictional element is necessary to help 
“establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’ regula-
tion of interstate commerce.” Id. at 612. 
The ESA’s statutory language makes it illegal for “any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any [en-
dangered] species within the United States.” 16 U.S.C. 
§1538(a)(1)(B). Plainly absent in the statute is any specific lan-
guage stating that the endangered species must affect interstate 
commerce. Id. Therefore, the ESA’s takings provision is missing a 
jurisdictional element with an “explicit connection” to interstate 
commerce. 
3. The Intrastate Regulation of Taking the 
Brittain County Karner Blue Butterfly Is Not 
Supported by Legislative History. 
The third factor is whether the ESA or the statute’s legislative 
history contain “express congressional findings” to support regu-
lating the activity’s effects upon interstate commerce. Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 612. Such findings help courts “evaluate the legislative 
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects inter-
state commerce, even though no substantial effect is visible to the 
naked eye.” Id. 
The ESA’s plain language makes no reference to the effects of 
endangered species on the economy or interstate commerce. See 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531 (“The Congress finds and declares that . . . these 
species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, edu-
cational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation 
and its people.”). Notably absent from this language is any use of 
the words “economic” or “commercial.” Id. This is because the ESA 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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is a statute focused on biodiversity and conservation, not the econ-
omy or regulation of interstate commerce. As one scholar stated, 
“[t]he biodiversity argument comes close to saying that because the 
earth is necessary for interstate commerce, anything that ad-
versely affects the earth can be regulated by Congress.” John 
Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands 
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 177, 199 (1998). However, this 
is the exact type of over-regulation that the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional in Lopez and Morrison. See United States v. Pat-
ton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Furthermore, the FWS final rule listing the Karner Blue But-
terfly as an endangered species contains no express findings that 
establish the butterfly’s relationship with interstate commerce. 
See 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992). The FWS final rule simply 
summarizes the history of the Karner Blue Butterfly, lists certain 
characteristics of the animal, and future conservation measures. 
Id. Noticeably absent from the rule is any discussion about the eco-
nomic market or substantial effect this butterfly has on interstate 
commerce. Id. As such, both the ESA and the FWS final rule are 
silent on any alleged effect this butterfly has on interstate com-
merce. 
4. The Connection Between Takes of the Karner 
Blue Butterfly and Interstate Commerce Is 
Attenuated. 
The final factor in the balancing test is whether the substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce is “attenuated.” Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 612. In Morrison, the Court rejected aggregating the “costs 
of crime” and “national productivity” arguments because they 
would “permit Congress to ‘regulate not only all violent crime, but 
all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how 
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.’” Id. (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 564). In doing so, the Court explained that this type of 
aggregation would attenuate the claimed substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce. Id. Similarly, if the Commerce Clause grants 
Congress the power to regulate the Karner Blue Butterfly, future 
courts would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual 
that Congress is without power to regulate.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
Therefore, the FWS and Plaintiff’s argument in support of consti-
tutionality is attenuated. 
13
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After properly considering the four factors articulated in Mor-
rison, the balancing test shows that Congress has no power to reg-
ulate this taking under the Commerce Clause. The taking is not an 
economic activity; there is no jurisdictional element limiting regu-
lation; legislative history does not support the regulation; and the 
connection to interstate commerce is attenuated. Therefore, the 
District Court’s holding should be reversed. 
C. The ESA Is Not a Larger Regulation of Economic 
Activity Because the Primary Focus of the Statute 
Is Conservation. 
Despite the clear answer provided by a proper analysis of 
Lopez and Morrison, other circuits have “piled inference upon in-
ference” to find that the ESA is constitutional. See San Luis & 
Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne, 
477 F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007). In these cases, both the Sal-
azar and Kempthorne Courts misconstrued the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Gonzalez v. Raich. 545 U.S. at 27-28. In Raich, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress, through the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (“CSA”), could regulate the growth of purely intrastate 
medical marijuana because it had a substantial effect on the regu-
lation of the interstate supply, consumption, and market of mari-
juana. Id. 
The ESA, however, is readily distinguishable from the CSA 
and Raich’s limited holding, as the ESA is regulating takings that 
do not have a larger economic purpose. See PETPO v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1346 (C.D. Utah 2014). 
Rather, the ESA’s primary purpose is on conservation, not supply 
or consumption. Id. Applying Raich to the taking of the Utah Prai-
rie Dog, a wholly intrastate species found on private land, the 
PETPO Court held that the Commerce Clause “does not authorize 
Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that has 
no substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. In PETPO, the 
Court found that ESA takes “differ[] significantly from Raich in 
one important way: takes of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal 
land would not substantially affect the national market for any 
commodity regulated by the ESA.” Id. Similarly, the taking of the 
Karner Blue Butterfly on the Cordelia Lot would not substantially 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
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affect any national market or have any effect on interstate com-
merce. Therefore, Raich supports a finding that Congress has no 
regulatory authority under the ESA over the Karner Blue Butter-
fly. 
The Tenth Circuit once quipped, “[A]ny use of anything might 
have an affect on interstate commerce, in the same sense [that] a 
butterfly flapping its wings in China might bring about a change 
of weather in New York.” Patton, 451 F.3d at 618. However, it is 
the duty of the judiciary to provide the appropriate checks and bal-
ances on Congress’s attempts to overstep its constitutionally-
granted powers. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that 
“the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting 
the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.” Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 619. The balancing test established in Lopez and 
Morrison affirms that the role of regulating and protecting the Kar-
ner Blue Butterfly should be left to Brittain County, and to the 
State of New Union. To hold otherwise would “effectively obliterate 
the distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. 
II. THE PLAINTIFF’S TAKINGS CLAIM IS NOT RIPE 
BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL 
FROM A FINAL INCIDENTAL TAKING PERMIT 
DECISION. 
For a regulatory taking, a claim “is not ripe until the govern-
ment entity charged with implementing the regulation has reached 
a final decision.” Morris v. U.S., 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (quoting Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Ham-
ilton Bank, 472 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). In the ESA context, “the final 
decision requirement has been held to mean that the takings claim 
is not ripe until an ITP has been applied for and, usually, denied.” 
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31796, THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS “TAKINGS” 6 (2013). 
The finality requirement is necessary to show to “a reasonable 
degree of certainty what limitations the agency will, pursuant to 
the regulations, place on the property.” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1376. 
This means that “when an agency provides procedures for obtain-
ing a final decision, a takings claim is unlikely to be ripe until the 
property owner complies with those procedures.” Id. Accordingly, 
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thus far, “no court has been willing to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to 
even apply for an ITP.” MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., at 6 (em-
phasis in original). 
A. The Plaintiff Failed to Follow the ESA Permit 
Procedures Because She Never Applied for an ITP. 
The ESA prohibits the “take” of certain listed species, but 
grants the Secretary the power to permit “incidental takings.” See 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1538-1539. To receive an ITP, “a person wishing to 
engage in acts that might effect a ‘take’ of a listed species must file 
an application [with the FWS] that includes a Habitat Conserva-
tion Plan (‘HCP’).” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1374; see also 50 C.F.R. 
§ 222.307 (outlining the permit process under the ESA for an inci-
dental taking). This is not an option, but rather is a requirement 
under the ESA to ensure the proper procedures are followed. See 
16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(1)(B); Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377-78.  Filing for 
an ITP also allows the FWS an opportunity to work with the prop-
erty owner to develop an appropriate plan. Morris, 392 F.3d at 
1377-78. 
Here, the Plaintiff never filed an ITP, therefore rendering her 
takings claim premature. The District Court found that the gov-
ernment declared a policy denying the Plaintiff an ITP by requir-
ing a condition that “would be impossible for [the] Plaintiff to sat-
isfy.” R. at 9. The District Court also granted the Plaintiff a “futility 
exception” based on the premise that the permit process would ex-
ceed the value of her property and would be burdensome. Id. How-
ever, both findings by the District Court are in error. 
B. The FWS Never Declared a Policy Denying the 
Plaintiff a Permit. 
The District Court incorrectly found that the FWS “declared a 
policy” denying the Plaintiff a permit. The Court claimed that the 
FWS recommendation letter constituted a condition that the Plain-
tiff could not satisfy. Rather, the letter simply advised the Plaintiff 
that an acceptable HCP would include replacing disturbed lupine 
field with contiguous lupine field. Id. Relying on Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, the District Court held that there was no need for the Plain-
tiff to apply for an ITP, as this application would be futile. 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). 
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While the Supreme Court has held that federal ripeness rules 
do not require the submission of “further and futile applications 
with other agencies,” the facts of the Palazzolo case are easily dis-
tinguished from the present case. In Palazzolo, the plaintiff applied 
a total of three times for a permit to build on wetlands with local 
county restrictions. Id. at 618-19. After the third application was 
denied, the plaintiff instituted a takings claim. Id. The Supreme 
Court rejected the county’s argument that the third denial was not 
a final decision, and held that any further applications would be 
futile. Id. at 626. Here, the District Court is attempting to analo-
gize a recommendation in a letter to the rejection of three applica-
tions. However, there are clearly factual and legal differences. 
The Supreme Court has held that the permit process is de-
signed to help property owners receive permission to use the prop-
erty as desired. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985). In Riverside Bayview, the Court 
stated: 
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a 
certain use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the property 
in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system im-
plies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free 
to use the property as desired. 
Id. Thus, the FWS letter was not a final decision but rather a rec-
ommendation to the Plaintiff to pave the way for the approval of 
her ITP. The Plaintiff claims that the recommendation “would be 
impossible to satisfy” as she is estranged from her sister, thereby 
eliminating the “contiguous land” option. R. at 9. However, there 
is no evidence that the Plaintiff apprised the FWS of the circum-
stances, such that an alternative plan could be formulated. Id. The 
Plaintiff received the recommendation from the FWS, and decided 
unilaterally to pursue an ADP. Had the Plaintiff informed the FWS 
of her alleged limitation to the property, a variance may have been 
granted or the FWS could have provided an alternative recommen-
dation. 
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C. The “Futility Exception” Is Not Applicable 
Because the Cost of the Permit Does Not Exceed 
Fair Market Value of the Property and Is Not 
Inherently Burdensome. 
The District Court erred by finding that the permit process 
would exceed the fair market value of the property and be overly 
burdensome. First, “[t]he cost of an ITP application is unknowable 
until the agency has had some meaningful opportunity to exercise 
its discretion to assist in the process.” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377 
(emphasis added). In Morris, the plaintiffs contacted the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to visit and evaluate whether 
harvesting protected trees would constitute a taking. Id. at 1374. 
The NMFS agent advised the plaintiffs that the action would effect 
a taking, and therefore they should apply for an ITP. Id. The plain-
tiffs obtained an estimate which stated that the cost of the ITP 
would exceed the value of the property, and immediately filed a 
takings action. Id. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims of a taking, the 
Morris Court stated that “the [plaintiffs’] claim cannot ripen until 
the agency refuses to exercise its discretion, or exercises its discre-
tion in a manner that makes reasonably clear or final the effect the 
regulation will have on the [plaintiff’s] application.” Id. at 1377-78. 
Here, the FWS was never given the opportunity to fully exer-
cise its discretion to assist in the process of formulating an ITP. It 
is thus unknown what the FWS could have done to reduce any al-
leged costs of the ITP. Therefore, the “futility exception” does not 
apply when the costs of the Plaintiff’s ITP are “unknowable.” Id. at 
1377. 
Additionally, the process of obtaining an ITP under the ESA is 
not “inherently burdensome.” The Habitat Conservation Planning 
and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook directs the FWS 
to assist the applicant and advise the property owner on “key policy 
and substantive issues.”2 If allowed, the FWS is to play an active 
role to ensure that the ITP process is as palatable as possible. The 
Plaintiff, however, never gave the FWS the opportunity to reduce 
or eliminate the claimed burden, as she immediately pursued an 
ADP. 
 
2. Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing 
Handbook (Nov. 4, 1996), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/laws/hcp_hand-
book.pdf. See pages 1-15 and 2-3. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
  
122 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 8 
The Plaintiff failed to follow ESA procedures and filed a tak-
ings claim prematurely. These procedures would have provided the 
FWS with the adequate information it needed to determine what 
actions were appropriate concerning the Plaintiff’s property. While 
the District Court granted the Plaintiff an exception, “[t]he futility 
exception . . . applies only where the agency’s conduct operates as 
a constructive denial of a permit, not where the permitting process 
is merely complex, arduous, or expensive.” Morris, 392 F.3d at 
1375. Therefore, the District Court erred by granting improper ex-
ceptions to the general rule of ripeness. 
III. THE RELEVANT PARCEL FOR THE TAKINGS 
ANALYSIS IS THE ENTIRETY OF LEAR ISLAND 
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO 
REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED 
EXPECTATIONS AND HAS ALWAYS TREATED 
LEAR ISLAND AS A SINGLE ECONOMIC UNIT. 
The District Court incorrectly determined that the relevant 
parcel for this taking is the Cordelia Lot, and not all of Lear Island. 
The District Court relied on the “formal subdivision” of Lear Island 
into three separate parcels, and treated this fact as dispositive. 
However, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected a cookie-cutter ap-
proach to determining the relevant parcel. See Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (“[The Court 
focuses on] the character of the action and on the nature and extent 
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”). Instead, 
courts should evaluate the “entire property interest at stake rather 
than individual property interests to determine if a regulatory tak-
ing has occurred.” Laura J. Powell, The Parcel as a Whole: Defining 
the Relevant Parcel in Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 151, 160 (2014). 
In applying the “parcel as a whole” rule, courts must focus on 
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” of the claimant 
and whether a given property is treated as a “single economic unit.” 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-25. Additional relevant factors in-
clude: “(i) the degree of contiguity between property interests; (ii) 
the dates of acquisition of property interests; (iii) the extent to 
which a parcel has been treated as a single income-producing unit; 
and (iv) the extent to which the regulated lands increase the value 
of the remaining lands.” Brace v. U.S., 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 348 (2006), 
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aff’d 250 Fed. Appx. 359 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1258 
(2008). These factors are not decisive by themselves, but are 
“weighed together, taking into account all relevant circumstances.” 
Powell, The Parcel as a Whole, 89 WASH. L. REV. at 160. However, 
the “regulation’s economic impact” often determines whether a reg-
ulatory taking has occurred.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (“[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large 
part . . . upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact.”) 
In order to balance the government’s interests with private 
property interests, the Supreme Court relies on overarching prin-
ciples of “fairness and justice” to guide the ad hoc decision. Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24. When appropriately balanced, these 
economic and fairness factors demonstrate that there were no rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations for the Cordelia Lot. Ad-
ditionally, the three subdivided lots on Lear Island have all been 
treated as one parcel and a single economic unit. Therefore, the 
appropriate denominator for the takings analysis is the entirety of 
Lear Island, and not the Cordelia Lot. 
A. The Plaintiff Has No Reasonable Investment-
Backed Expectations for the Cordelia Lot Because 
She Had Notice of the Regulatory Restrictions and 
Made No Financial Investment in the Lot. 
For any regulatory takings claim to succeed, “the claimant 
must show that the government’s regulatory restraint interfered 
with [her] investment-backed expectations in a manner that re-
quires the government to [provide] compensat[ion].” Good v. U.S., 
189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Loveladies Harbor v. 
U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). As the Supreme Court 
has stated, “[a] landowner cannot demonstrate a taking ‘simply by 
showing [it was] denied the ability to exploit a property interest.’” 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. These investment-backed expecta-
tions must be “reasonable and based on existing conditions,” and 
“not merely a unilateral expectation or an abstract need.” Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984). 
For example, in Good v. United States, the Court denied com-
pensation to a property owner who, after receiving several permits 
to fill wetlands on his property, was denied a renewal of a wetlands 
fill permit under the Endangered Species Act. Good, 189 F.3d at 
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1363. Despite the owner purchasing the property with the inten-
tion to develop it, the Court determined that: 
the property owner had notice over a nearly twenty-year period of 
an existing regulatory scheme that made the proposed project po-
tentially difficult or impossible to complete. [Therefore], the owner 
had not demonstrated that he held reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. 
Id. Similarly, the Plaintiff here cannot claim she had reasonable 
investment-backed expectations to build on the Cordelia Lot. The 
Plaintiff’s fee simple rights to the Cordelia Lot did not vest until 
her father passed away in 2005. At that time, the Brittain County 
wetlands regulation had been in place for twenty-three years, and 
the Karner Blue Butterfly had been listed under the ESA for thir-
teen years. As in Good, these regulatory schemes put the Plaintiff 
on notice that the right to build on the property would likely be 
restricted. Good, 189 F.3d at 1361. 
Additionally, the Plaintiff made no economic investment in the 
ten-acre parcel. Lear Island was granted by Congress in 1803, and 
was inherited by her father, who then subdivided lots to his daugh-
ters. With no personal financial stake in the Cordelia Lot, any com-
pensation would amount to a “windfall,” which should be viewed 
with special scrutiny. Id.; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 
(“[S]ome property owners may reap windfalls and an important in-
dicium of fairness is lost.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
B. The Plaintiff and Her Family Have Always Treated 
Lear Island as a Single Economic Unit. 
The Supreme Court has held that where legally separate par-
cels are treated as a single economic unit, “together they may con-
stitute the relevant parcel.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedicts, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). As other courts have aptly 
noted, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has never endorsed a 
test that segments a contiguous property to determine the relevant 
parcel.” Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis. 
1996). Rather, the Court has consistently held that a property in 
such a case “should be considered as a whole.” Id. 
For example, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals has previ-
ously held that the “parcel as a whole” rule required the Court to 
examine an entire thirty-eight lot parcel, and not just the legally 
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subdivided parcel that was unbuildable due to a wetlands by-law, 
as all of the lots were contiguous and used together. FIC Homes of 
Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Commission of Blackstone, 673 
N.E.2d 61, 70-71(Mass. App. Ct. 1996). In a similar case, the same 
Court held that even though one of eleven legally subdivided lots 
could not be developed, there was not a taking because there was 
still “economically beneficial use of the original parcel as a whole.” 
Zanghi v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 807 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2004). 
It is undisputed that Lear Island has been treated as one par-
cel for over 200 years. Since 1803, Cornelius Lear and his descend-
ants have occupied the entirety of Lear Island. R. at 5. The family 
built one causeway that connects the island to the mainland of 
Brittain County. Id. Without this causeway, none of the subdivided 
lots would have value, much less access to society. Similarly, the 
Cordelia Lot is only accessible through the main portion of Lear 
Island. Id. Just like the Courts in FIC Homes and Zanghi, this 
Court should not view the subdivision of Lear Island as dispositive. 
Instead, the Court should treat the parcel in the same way the 
Plaintiff and her family have: as one economic unit with access to 
all family members. 
C. Justice and Fairness Support Viewing the 
Entirety of Lear Island as the Relevant Parcel. 
Finally, in making a Fifth Amendment takings determination, 
courts must assess whether a claimant’s proffered conception of the 
“parcel as a whole” comports with principles of “fairness and jus-
tice.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24. The Supreme Court stated: 
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole. 
Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Armstrong supports the 
idea of a “balancing test within a balancing test.” Jeffrey M. Gaba, 
Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and 
the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 574-75 (2007). In 
other words, courts should not only consider the relevant parcel as 
a whole, but also balance “fairness and justice” throughout the 
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analysis. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of 
achieving “fairness and justice” in both Palazzolo and Tahoe-Si-
erra. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (discussing the balancing role 
of “fairness and justice”); see also Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336 
(discussing whether “fairness and justice” would support categori-
cal takings rules). 
The District Court’s determination that the Cordelia Lot is the 
relevant parcel for this taking clearly violates the concepts of “fair-
ness and justice.” The Lear family has enjoyed the benefits of own-
ing Lear Island for more than 200 years. Moreover, the Island 
given to the family by Congress is worth approximately 
$10,000,000.3 R. at 4. The regulations placed on 1% of the property 
serve societal interests in both protecting Endangered Species and 
preserving the County’s wetlands. While it is unfortunate that the 
Karner Blue Butterfly populates the location in which the Plaintiff 
would like to build a house, this fact does not support treating the 
Lot as the denominator in a takings analysis. Based on the Su-
preme Court’s takings jurisprudence, the relevant parcel is clearly 
Lear Island. Any other interpretation would be “unfair” and “un-
just.” 
IV. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY 
THE CORDELIA LOT, THE PLAINTIFF’S TOTAL 
TAKINGS CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE LOT 
RETAINS FUTURE ECONOMIC VALUE. 
Even if this Court finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant 
parcel, a total taking has not occurred because the lot will be de-
velopable in the future, thereby retaining economic value. In a tak-
ings case, there are two types of analysis: (1) a total taking under 
Lucas; and (2) a temporary or partial taking under Penn Central. 
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). According to the Plaintiff and 
the District Court, since the Plaintiff cannot build a home on her 
property today, she deserves to be compensated for the lost value 
of her entire property. However, this approach was unequivocally 
rejected by the Supreme Court. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341. 
 
3. The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot is $100,000. R. at 5. Therefore, 
the entirety of Lear Island is worth approximately $10,000,000 based on a $10,000 
per acre calculation. 
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In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court held that a 36-month building mor-
atorium was not a total taking because it did not deny the property 
owner of all economic value. Id. at 339. The Court stated that this 
type of moratorium was, at most, a temporary taking and not a 
total taking. Id. The Court reaffirmed that any taking that results 
in less than a 100% loss of economic value would not meet the re-
quirements under Lucas. Id. at 330. Instead, these temporary tak-
ings claims should be brought and analyzed under the Penn Cen-
tral balancing test. Id. (“Anything less than a ‘complete elimination 
of value,’ or a ‘total loss’ . . . would require the kind of analysis ap-
plied in Penn Central.”). Since the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra failed 
to argue that a temporary taking has occurred, the Supreme Court 
refused to apply a Penn Central balancing test. Id. Instead, the 
Court held that, under Lucas, the plaintiffs did not suffer a taking 
as they did not lose 100% of the economic value because they could 
use the property in the future. Id. at 341. 
A. The Building Moratorium Does Not Deprive the 
Plaintiff of All Economic Value Because the 
Cordelia Lot Is Developable in the Future. 
The District Court attempted to rationalize a total taking by 
noting that the moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra was shorter than the 
proposed moratorium for the Plaintiff. Admittedly, the District 
Court is correct in finding that the moratorium would likely last 
longer than the 36 months in Tahoe-Sierra. However, the Supreme 
Court has refused to formulate a rule that moratoriums lasting 
longer than a certain amount of time would count as total takings. 
Id. at 321. Instead, the Court held that a property “cannot be ren-
dered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, be-
cause the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is 
lifted.” Id. at 332. 
Applying the holding in Tahoe-Sierra, the building morato-
rium on the Cordelia Lot clearly does not deprive the Plaintiff of 
all economic value. The Plaintiff has the ability to use and develop 
the Cordelia Lot in the future, once the moratorium is naturally 
lifted through the ecological process. Thus, the Plaintiff’s total tak-
ings claim brought under Lucas fails to meet the requirement for 
total loss of all economic value. 
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B. The Plaintiff Failed to Bring a Temporary Taking 
Claim Under Penn Central. 
In rejecting the total takings claim under Lucas, the Tahoe-
Sierra Court noted that its holding did not preclude an analysis of 
a temporary taking under Penn Central. Id. at 317-18.  However, 
the Tahoe-Sierra Court did not apply the Penn Central balancing 
test because the plaintiffs failed to bring a temporary takings 
claim. Id. Similarly, the Plaintiff in this case failed to bring a tem-
porary or partial takings claim under Penn Central. R. at 8 (“Plain-
tiff does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking based 
on Penn Central.”). Therefore, this Court should only analyze the 
taking under the Lucas rule. 
Even if this Court undertakes a Penn Central analysis sua 
sponte, despite the Plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue, a temporary 
takings claim would fail. As discussed above, the Plaintiff cannot 
establish the necessary “reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions” that is the crux of a temporary taking. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 
540. Since the Plaintiff is not claiming a partial or temporary tak-
ing, this Court should heed the Supreme Court’s advisement in Ta-
hoe-Sierra and not find a temporary taking where one has not been 
properly alleged.  Hence, the Plaintiff’s total takings claim against 
Brittain County and the FWS fails. 
V. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY 
THE CORDELIA LOT, THERE IS NOT A TOTAL 
TAKINGS BECAUSE THE CORDELIA LOT HAS 
CURRENT ECONOMIC VALUE. 
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, the Brit-
tain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per year for 
wildlife viewing precludes a takings claim for complete loss of eco-
nomic value. The Plaintiff was not deprived of all beneficial use of 
her land, even if she cannot develop the land in the manner that 
she had hoped. 
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A. The Plaintiff is Not Deprived of All Beneficial Use 
Because the Cordelia Lot Can Be Used in Other 
Economic Ways. 
A total taking under Lucas may only be found in “the extraor-
dinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial 
use of land is permitted.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (emphasis in 
original). Importantly, the Lucas Court went so far as to suggest 
that not even a “95%” diminution in property value may suffice. Id. 
at 1019 n.8. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed 
that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraor-
dinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property 
of all value.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). Ac-
cordingly, jurisdictions have been generally unforgiving with the 
application of the Lucas rule to property owners, rarely finding 
that a total taking has occurred. Patricia E. Salkin, Total Takings 
Cases and Principles, 2 Am. Law. Zoning § 16:7 (5th ed.). 
The reality is that, in some cases, the landowner with a 95% 
loss will get nothing, while the landowner with a total loss will re-
cover in full. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. The Court is clear that 
“takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’ situations.” Id. For ex-
ample, no total taking occurred where a company’s land lost 91% 
of its value after its mining permit was revoked. Rith Energy, Inc. 
v. U.S., 270 F.3d 1347, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In a New York 
state case, the court held that certain wetlands regulations, which 
decreased the value of the property by 95% and left a “bare residue” 
of the property’s value, did not constitute a categorical taking un-
der Lucas. Friedenburg v. New York State Dept. of Environmental 
Conservation, 767 N.Y. S.2d 451, 460 (App. Div. 2003). 
The Supreme Court also suggests that it is incorrect to assume 
that “the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution 
are developmental uses.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8. Contrarily, 
there are “a number of noneconomic interests in land. . . .” Id. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit held that a city landmark ordinance 
did not deprive a property owner of “all economically beneficial or 
productive use of its property.” Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chi-
cago, 153 F.3d 356, 368 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court found that, even 
with a landmark designation and denial of demolition permits, the 
property owner could alternatively use the property as its office or 
a museum. Id. at 368. 
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Here, the Plaintiff asserts that her property has no value un-
less there is a house on the Cordelia Lot. However, the Butterfly 
Society’s offer demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s land has current 
value, even if it is not in the manner in which she hoped. Addition-
ally, the Lot can be used for other aesthetic or recreational pur-
poses. While there may be a decrease in property value, this alone 
does not meet the total loss requirement of Lucas. Specifically, the 
Plaintiff still maintains ownership of a piece of property that can 
provide her income. Therefore, the current economic uses of the 
Cordelia Lot prelude the Plaintiff’s total takings claim. 
B. The Property Tax Does Not Negate the Lot’s 
Current Economic Value Because It Is a Fixed 
Cost of Property Ownership. 
The amount of the property tax does not negate the current 
economic value of the Cordelia Lot. The property tax is simply a 
cost of owning the property; it is unavoidable. State courts, which 
typically hear more takings cases than federal courts, have noted 
that “[t]he takings clause . . . does not charge the government with 
guaranteeing the profitability of every piece of land subject to its 
authority.” Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 
1994). Further, the Texas Supreme Court explained that “[p]ur-
chasing and developing real estate carries with it certain financial 
risks, and it is not the government’s duty to underwrite this risk 
as an extension of obligations under the takings clause.” Id. 
This Court should apply the Taub holding to the Plaintiff’s 
case, as it is not the responsibility of the FWS or Brittain County 
to ensure the marketability or profitability of her land. With one 
monetary offer for butterfly exhibits, it is possible that the Plaintiff 
could obtain additional offers, further solidifying the monetary 
value of her property. Frankly, without the offer, the Plaintiff 
would still pay $1,500 per year in property tax, as she has been 
doing for almost a decade. Thus, the Butterfly Society’s offer pro-
vides the Plaintiff with current economic value for the land, along 
with its aesthetic and recreational uses. Therefore, a total takings 
claim under Lucas is precluded. 
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VI. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY 
THE CORDELIA LOT, THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM 
FAILS BECAUSE PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES 
INHERENT IN TITLE PRECLUDE A TAKING. 
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, public 
trust principles inherent in title preclude the Plaintiff’s claim for a 
taking based on the denial of a county wetlands permit. The Dis-
trict Court incorrectly held that no public trust reservation existed 
in 1803, the Congressional grant was superior to a subsequent 
“equal footing” claim by New Union, and that background princi-
ples of state property law did not preclude a takings claim against 
the County. R. at 10. However, all of these findings were in error. 
A. The Land Below Lake Union Is Part of the Public 
Trust Because Lake Union is Navigable-in-Fact. 
Under the public trust doctrine, navigable waterways are 
“held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters.” Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In the United States, the public trust doctrine 
applies to navigable waters that are non-tidal as well as tidal. See 
PPL Mont. LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226-27 (2012). 
In determining whether a waterway is navigable, and thus 
whether the land below the water is subject to the public trust doc-
trine, courts employ the Supreme Court’s four-part “navigability-
in-fact” test. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 562 
(1870). Under that test, waterways are navigable in fact if they are 
used: 
[1] in their ordinary condition, [2] as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted [3] in the custom-
ary modes of trade and travel on water . . . [4] when they form . . . 
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued high-
way over which commerce is or may be carried on.4 
Id. 
Here, the Plaintiff’s property meets the requirements for the 
navigability-in-fact test. First, Lake Union meets the “trade or 
 
4. The Supreme Court later eliminated the “ordinary condition” requirement 
in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940). 
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travel” prong as it has traditionally provided an interstate com-
mercial waterway for the transportation of produce from the island 
to the mainland. R. at 5. Additionally, the wetlands that the Plain-
tiff desires to fill were historically open water used as a boat land-
ing for said commercial transport. Id. Second, the “customary 
modes” prong has been interpreted to mean that a waterway must 
be capable of navigation simply by a small boat or canoe, which 
would certainly have been a mode of commercial transportation 
when the island was granted in 1803, and for much of its history. 
See, e.g., FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Lake Union and the cove meet this prong 
because the shallow cove of Lake Union has historically been used 
for a boat landing. R. at 5. Moreover, the depth needed for naviga-
bility in 1803 was not great, as most boats were of much smaller 
size than boats typically used for commerce today. Finally, the 
“highway for commerce” prong is clearly met, as the cove of the 
Cordelia Lot originates from and flows into the navigable, inter-
state waters of Lake Union. Id. 
The Plaintiff further asserted that Lake Union, as a non-tidal 
water, was not included in the public trust at the time of the 1803 
grant. In determining that the Plaintiff’s claims to lands under wa-
ter within 300 feet of the shoreline did not fall within public trust 
limits in 1803, the District Court relied upon a collection of state 
court cases cited in PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1227. However, the 
District Court’s reliance upon the cases cited within PPL Montana 
is inapposite. 
First, while the state court cases cited in PPL Montana repre-
sent the dates at which those particular states adopted the public 
trust doctrine for non-tidally-influenced waters, they do not 
demonstrate that other states, including New Union, had not pre-
viously adopted the doctrine. In fact, the Court in PPL Montana 
simply suggested that after the American Revolution in the 1770s, 
states began changing their standards for the public trust away 
from the tidal requirement. Id. at 1227. Further, the District Court 
failed to consider the Supreme Court’s navigability-in-fact test, 
which clearly demonstrates that the lands underwater within 300 
feet of the shoreline would have been considered navigable at the 
time of the Congressional grant, and thus limited by public trust 
29
  
2017] BEST BRIEF: BRITTAIN COUNTY 133 
principles. Since Lake Union is navigable-in-fact and non-tidal wa-
ters are included in the public trust, the land below Lake Union is 
properly subject to the public trust. Id. at 1226. 
B. The 1803 Congressional Grant of the Land Below 
Lake Union to the Lear Family Is Void Under the 
“Equal Footing” Doctrine Because Only the State 
of New Union Had Authority to Grant the 
Underlying Lands. 
If the subject land is determined to be below a navigable wa-
terway and thus part of the public trust, any conveyance of title by 
Congress to the underlying soil became void upon the state’s acces-
sion to the union. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1892). In 
Shively, the defendant brought suit to quiet title to lands below the 
high-water mark on the Columbia River that he had acquired pur-
suant to a purchase from the State of Oregon. Id. at 2. The defend-
ant claimed that the grant held by the plaintiff from the United 
States passed no title or right as against a subsequent deed from 
the state to the defendant. Id. The Plaintiff appealed the judgment 
of the Oregon Supreme Court, which declared that the land be-
longed to the defendant. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision, holding that navigable waters and the soils beneath them 
remain public highways. Id. at 58. Moreover, the Court affirmed 
that once a state accedes to the union, all grants and laws applica-
ble to the former territory become null and void, and all lands be-
come property of the state, to be regulated and disposed of accord-
ing to state law. Id. 
In arriving at its holding, the Shively Court explained that: 
[g]rants by Congress of portions of the public lands [below naviga-
ble waterways] within a Territory to settlers thereon, though 
bounded by navigable waters, convey, of their own force, no title or 
right below high water mark, and do not impair the title and do-
minion of the future State when created; but leave the question of 
the use. . .to the sovereign control of each State. 
Shively, 152 U.S. at 58. Thus, any title to the lands below Lake 
Union that were conveyed to the Lears by the 1803 Congressional 
grant became null and void upon the accession of New Union as a 
state – regardless of when that occurred. In order for the Lears’ 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/4
  
134 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 8 
title to be valid, they must demonstrate a right to the land con-
veyed to them by New Union. There is no evidence on the record 
that the Lears ever received title from the state, and, therefore 
they show no valid claim to the land beneath Lake Union. 
C. Lucas Precludes Compensation for the Plaintiff’s 
Claim Because Filling Public Trust Wetlands 
Constitutes a Nuisance. 
While the holding in Shively nullifies the Plaintiff’s claim of 
title to lands below Lake Union, Lucas also holds that compensa-
tion is not required for development limits that “inhere in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004. The Supreme Court has stated that “zon-
ing and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state prop-
erty law,” as “[z]oning regulations existed as far back as colonial 
Boston.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352. Additionally, environmen-
tal law scholars generally agree that wetland protection regula-
tions qualify as longstanding features of state property law, as 
English law sought to prevent the destruction of wetlands even be-
fore the colonies enacted zoning regulations. See, e.g., Michael C. 
Blumm, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Princi-
ples as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 
358 (2005). 
Collectively, the judicial system’s traditional emphasis on the 
importance of wetlands to the environment and the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of background principles of state property law 
show that the County’s denial of a wetlands fill permit constitutes 
a restriction already placed upon land ownership at the time of the 
Congressional grant. See Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Inte-
rior, 951 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the destruction 
of wetlands could produce an “environmental catastrophe” and 
that wetlands are critical to flood control, water supply, water 
quality, and wildlife). Accordingly, denials of dredge and fill per-
mits are not subject to takings liability because such denials 
simply prevent the equivalent of a nuisance. See Blumm at 337 
(citing Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth 
Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 
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29 ENVTL. L. 939, 971). For this reason, Brittain County’s regula-
tion denying the Plaintiff a fill permit is immune from any Lucas 
takings claim. 
VII. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY 
THE CORDELIA LOT, FWS AND BRITTAIN 
COUNTY ARE NOT JOINTLY LIABLE BECAUSE 
THE REGULATIONS ARE CLEARLY DIVISIBLE. 
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, the ESA 
and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law must be con-
sidered separately. The two regulations cover different portions of 
the Lot and were enacted ten years apart. The ESA is the regula-
tory scheme that conflicts with the Plaintiff’s desire to build on the 
Cordelia Lot. The Wetlands Preservation Law, however, does not 
prohibit any construction on the Heath, which makes up 90% of 
the Cordelia Lot. Accordingly, the County’s regulation does not de-
prive the Plaintiff of all economic value. Therefore, the FWS and 
Brittain County should not be held jointly and severally liable. 
A. The District Court Erred by Applying a Minority 
Rule of Tort Law to the Cordelia Lot Because Most 
Jurisdictions Apply Several or Modified Joint and 
Several Liability. 
In an attempt to answer a novel question of law, the District 
Court chose to apply a doctrine of tort law to this taking claim. 
However, the District Court erred by claiming that joint and sev-
eral liability is the “prevailing” rule. Rather, the trend in the 
United States has shown a move away from pure joint and several 
liability. See Joint and Several Liability, 1 Comparative Negli-
gence Manual §1:24 (3d ed.). Currently, only eight states apply 
pure joint and several liability, where the plaintiff may collect any 
portion of the judgment from either defendant. See American Tort 
Reform Association, Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform.5 
However, fourteen states apply pure several liability while twenty-
eight states apply modified joint and several liability. Id. Most 
 
5. American Tort Reform Association, Joint and Several Liability Rule Re-
form, http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-reform (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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states shy away from pure joint and several liability, as it often 
creates unfair liabilities amongst the tortfeasors. 
The District Court stretched tort liability, sua sponte, into 
property and takings law. This Court, however, should not apply a 
rule that is in fact the minority rule across the country. Specifi-
cally, the County regulation only restricts about one acre of wet-
lands within the entire ten-acre property. If the regulation were 
actually a taking, it equates to only a 10% liability for the County. 
In states applying a form of modified joint liability, which is the 
predominant rule, it would be extremely unlikely for a court to re-
quire a party with 10% fault to pay 90% of the overall damages. 
See, e.g., Narkeeta Timber Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 777 So.2d 39, 42 
(Miss. 2000) (In a state applying modified joint liability, the court 
held that a defendant who was 20% at fault could not be held liable 
for more than 50% of the judgment). 
B. The Alleged Damages Should Be Apportioned 
Because the Regulations Are Divisible. 
Even if this Court finds a total taking, the damages are easily 
divisible and should be apportioned. The Restatement Second of 
Torts § 433A provides: 
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more 
causes where 
  (a) there are distinct harms, or 
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution 
of each cause to a single harm. 
Id. The Restatement supports the idea of fair and equitable appor-
tionment of fault when damages are clearly divisible. 
In the present case, the county wetlands regulation was in 
place ten years before the ESA’s regulation and does not restrict 
the same portion of the property. Therefore, a reasonable basis for 
determining the liability for each defendant is to allot the damages 
based on the percentage of the Cordelia Lot that each law restricts. 
See, e.g., Roebuck v. Duprey, 274 A.D.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. 2000) (In a 
modified joint liability state, “while it is sometimes the case that 
tortfeasors who neither act concurrently nor in concert may never-
theless be considered jointly and severally liable, this occurs [only] 
in those instances where certain injuries are ‘incapable of any rea-
sonable or practicable division or allocation among multiple tort-
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feasors.’”).  Under this approach, the FWS would be liable for 90%, 
while Brittain County would be liable for 10%. 
The District Court played the role of the Plaintiff’s lawyer and 
applied a minority rule of tort law to a property takings case, with-
out regard to the fairness towards the Defendants. The fact that 
the Plaintiff forfeited any damages over $10,000 against the FWS 
is a procedural bar that she elected to place upon herself. This 
Court should not punish the County for the Plaintiff’s decision to 
forfeit possible damages. Accordingly, the ESA and the County 
wetlands law should be considered separately, which precludes a 
total takings claim. In the alternative, this Court should reverse 
the $90,000 judgment against the County. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ESA is an unconstitutional violation of Congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause because the Karner Blue But-
terfly does not substantially affect interstate commerce. In the al-
ternative, the Plaintiff’s takings claim fails because it is not ripe, 
as she failed to apply for an ITP. Additionally, the parcel as a whole 
rule supports viewing Lear Island as the relevant parcel for the 
takings analysis, and not the subdivided Cordelia Lot. If the Court 
finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant parcel, a total taking has 
not occurred because the lot retains future economic value. The 
property also retains current economic value through the $1,000 
annual payment from the Butterfly Society. Furthermore, public 
trust principles inherent in title preclude a taking against the 
County. Finally, the ESA and County Wetlands regulations are 
clearly divisible, and any alleged damages should be apportioned. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order of the District Court, 
and find in favor of the positions asserted by Brittain County. 
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